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Abstract. Traditional rational choice theories of voting state that, in a scenario with positive voting 
costs, people will vote only when they are pivotal. This hypothesis is contradicted by the frequent 
observation of relatively high rates of electoral turnout. Over the last few decades, several 
approaches have been developed in attempts to explain the paradox of not voting and to define more 
realistic behavioural rules, both within the rational voter framework and in opposition to that 
paradigm. This study offers a critical review of bounded rationality-based dynamic models. This 
class of model seems to be more promising than previous models in that it offers results consistent 
with observed voting patterns and investigates voter choices while assuming that social processes 
develop continuously. 
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1. Rational theories of electoral behaviour and turnout: the paradox of not voting. 
Traditional rational choice theories of voting state that, given positive voting costs, people will vote 
for their preferred candidate only when their vote affects election outcomes. This is the so-called 
instrumental voter approach, whereby individuals are assumed to act in politics as they do in the 
market in order to obtain the maximum utility level according to a cost-benefit evaluation. 
In the Downs (1957) model, each voter i, preferring candidate j, votes if and only if her expected 
utility is higher than voting costs: 
 
 
 
where  is the probability of the vote being pivotal,  is the net individual utility the voter gets in 
the event that her preferred candidate is elected and  is the cost of voting. Because falls to zero 
as the number of voters increases, the turnout level in large elections should be very low when 
voting costs are positive. 
In fact, relatively high levels of electoral participation have often been reported in democratic 
countries. This is the so-called paradox of not voting that several researchers have studied in the last 
decade. Within the rational agent framework, Riker and Ordeshook (1968) included the D-term to 
suggest that individuals vote out of a sense of civic duty. Another approach has included other 
sources of individual utility within the B-term in order to capture some aspects of the turnout 
pattern in both cross-sectional and time-series analyses. Additionally, empirical works have shown 
that individuals perceive the act of voting not to be costly or even that the C-term matters only for 
those who have a weak sense of duty with regard to voting (Blais 2000, Blais and Young 2000, 
Knack 1994). Finally, Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983, 1985) started another line of research involving 
the p-term.  
Considering the rational model and its developments, one can note a few broadly accepted 
predictions (Levine and Palfrey 2007): the negative correlation between the size of the electorate 
and turnout rates (the size effect); the higher turnout rates associated with closer elections (the 
competition effect); and finally, the higher turnout propensity among supporters of the less 
preferred candidate (the underdog effect). 
Despite these points of consensus, there is no broadly accepted model of voter behaviour. One 
might even argue that theoretical sophistications, so far, have only led to a view of the act of voting 
that is not terribly rich in its predictive ability. See, for example, the lower turnout rates reported 
among students who were exposed to a presentation about rational models of turnout, in the 
experiment run by Blais and Young (1999). 
Recently, however, other scholars have modelled opposing approaches excluding or redefining 
rationality assumptions in a dynamic setting (the learning and evolutionary models). These models 
suggest that voting can be viewed as a dynamic process based on adaptation and driven either at the 
individual level—in learning voting (LV) models—or the aggregate level—in evolutionary game-
theoretic voting (EV) models. Although it has scarcely been tested, the dynamic approach seems to 
be more promising than the static one in terms of producing results consistent with observed voting 
patterns. This study, then, offers a critical review of dynamic and bounded rational models, both 
from the theoretical and empirical points of view. 
 
2. Dynamic voting: LV vs. EV. 
Learning voting models (LV) and evolutionary voting models (EV) differ from traditional rational 
theories of voter behaviour in assuming individual rationality to be bounded and in modelling 
individual behaviour in a dynamic sense. As opposed to the rational agent approach, both LV and 
EV suggest that individuals behave over time according to an adaptation algorithm. Such an 
adaptation process may occur either at the individual (LV) or the aggregate level (EV). 
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In EV, individuals are programmed with certain strategies. These strategies compete in the 
evolutionary process on the basis of the relative fitness they confer on individuals. LV, meanwhile, 
assumes that individuals adapt their behaviour over successive elections on the basis of a 
satisfaction level. Voters learn how to play on the basis of their own past experience or that of 
others. 
Evolutionary game theory was initially developed by a biologist (Smith 1982) who introduced the 
Evolutionary Stable Strategy (EES), which can be viewed as a refinement of the Nash Equilibrium 
in a dynamic (evolutionary) sense. In political behaviour applications, voters are assumed to be 
backward-looking and adaptive instead of utility maximizing. Neither LV nor EV requires the 
rationality assumption, as individuals do not maximize any utility function. These approaches seem 
to be the most promising for solving the paradox of not voting. 
 
3. Evolutionary Game Theory: an overview. 
While in biological evolutionary games individuals are programmed to play a fixed strategy, 
economic models focus attention on how individuals behave - or in other words, how they choose 
the best strategy. Thus, in EV models, strategies compete, and those strategies associated with 
higher payoffs (fitness) survive. 
As has been stated, fitness measures the success of a strategy. A fitness function maps the payoffs 
structure derived by a symmetric game with respect to the shares of types within the population 
(Linzer and Honaker 2003). A fitness function is a probabilistic payoff function that predicts the 
expected payoff for given a type’s share. 
The basic intuition behind EV is that individual behaviour cannot be restricted in a one-shot choice 
because social processes are not fixed but rather vary with respect to starting conditions and 
population structure. The EV faces the problem of a world where social processes continuously 
develop. In EV, the dynamic process depends on a selection mechanism. The most common 
dynamic process is the so-called Replicator Dynamics or Proportional Fitness Rule (PFR), which 
was proposed by Taylor (1978). The PFR is based on the idea that the growth rate of each 
type/strategy ( ) is proportional to its fitness  compared with the average fitness in the 
population : 
 
 
 
Considering multiple rounds, the share of a type/strategy for each round is defined by: 
 
, 
 
where is the share of type I at time t; and are, respectively, the share of type i 
and its share in the population in the previous year;  is the average fitness in the population 
calculated at time ( . Although several specifications of the dynamic process exist, the payoff 
monotonicity is a basic assumption. 
  
3.1 An evolutionary theory of voting 
Linzer and Honaker (2003) generalize the classic EV in allowing both full rationality and a non-
random pairing. The second feature, specifically, has a massive consequence in that it allows for 
group membership to have an effect on the evolution dynamics. Linzer and Honaker develop two 
models, both predicting a positive level of turnout in the long run, that diverge in considering 
individuals to be either rational or else pure automata.  
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In the non-rational game, the population is divided into types, each of which is defined by its 
turnout probability. For each pair of population types interacting (τ1,τ2), the fitness function maps 
F(τ1,τ2) for a given cost of voting c, representing the fitness payoffs to type τ1 when interacting with 
τ2. Each type’s growth dynamic is assumed to be proportional to the difference between the type’s 
fitness and the average fitness in the population (PFR). Evolution is allowed over periods. Under 
random pairing, the evolution of types converges to zero turnout. A positive turnout equilibrium 
occurs when pairing is assumed to be correlated among like types, i.e., including group dynamics 
into the participation game. The authors allow for spatial correlation and show that for given levels 
of voting costs, there are some values of spatial correlation that are associated with positive turnout. 
Moreover, equilibria do not depend on the initial distribution of turnout probabilities. Then, in the 
second model, Linzer and Honaker consider a one-dimensional policy space, wherein each 
individual has political preferences (fi) correlated with her fitness. Individuals also have political 
preferences (ui) that do not necessarily depend on fitness. Individuals may vote for party L or R or 
abstain. For instance, a voter votes for  if: 
 
, 
  
where  and  are party positions,  and  represent Gaussian noise depending on individual 
information stock and  is an indifferent (positive) margin that captures the perceived cost of 
voting. They vote for R if the right-hand side is higher and abstain otherwise. A voter’s fitness 
depending on the outcome of the election is defined as: 
 
 
, 
 
where   is a positive constant. Then, individuals whose fitness levels are low change their political 
preference. Assuming a random distribution of fitness values over the policy space, the model 
predicts a bimodal distribution of preferences. Furthermore, those voters with high d and low info 
stock are more likely to abstain. Finally, turnout probability is not homogeneous with respect to 
political preferences because it is higher in centrist voters than it is in right- or left-wing voters. 
Conley and Toossi et al. (2006) adopt the evolutionary memetic
2
 approach in order to endogenise 
the civic duty sense through modelling a two-group dynamic system. They model a world where 
groups are heterogeneous in values and ideas and compete to affect the social value system. They 
find that public-spirited groups may have an advantage in the long run when voting costs are lower 
than the benefits of winning. Groups are characterized by different likelihoods of voting and by 
preferences regarding public expenditures, and individuals (within groups) act in a non-rational 
manner. More specifically, the authors distinguish between the high type group that can be viewed 
as the mainstream of society, whose benefits/costs deriving from public proposals are distributed 
uniformly within the interval [-1,1], and the low type group that is partially integrated into society 
and thus, is only partially affected by established public policies. Formally, the benefits of low type 
voters are represented by the random variable: 
 
, 
 
                                                   
2 The memetic approach refers to imitation processes based on cultural transmission developed by Dawkins (1978). 
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where  is distributed uniformly and independently over the interval [-1,1] and  is the preference 
correlation parameter. That is, the distribution of benefits among low type citizens occurs when low 
type agents are totally correlated or uncorrelated. In other words, low types suffer a disadvantage 
from not being fully integrated within the economic context, in contradistinction to the mainstream 
type.  
Then, citizens belonging to the two groups vote directly for a proposal. 
The voting propensities of the two types are defined as  and  and  
 
 
 
represents the relative public spirit, so that the turnout rate among type j is equal to 
 
, 
 
where is the share of type j within the population. 
Assuming positive and constant voting costs, the adaptive dynamics follow the PFR over a 
continuous period. 
The EES concept is used in order to derive long-run stable states that, in turn, depend on the values 
of the three parameters: α, β and C. There are three possible equilibria: the high type wins (  
is globally stable); the Low type wins (  is globally stable); the large population wins (in this 
case there are three steady states: , but the latter is unstable and the final 
outcome depends on the length of attraction basins  ). The authors prove that 
under the third equilibrium, increasing voting costs result in a disadvantage for the high type group 
in an evolutionary sense. In other words, with relatively high voting costs, the initial population 
share of the high type group must be large in order to avoid long-run defeat.  
However, when costs are extremely high, voting is disadvantageous in the long run because high 
type voters’ expected benefits are lower than are those of low type individuals. Public spirit, on the 
other hand, always results in an advantage under low voting costs. Moreover, when α falls to 0, 
types with higher voting propensities win. 
Sieg and Schulz (1995) initially defined the Evolutionary Voting Equilibrium (EVE) as a 
refinement of the Symmetric Evolutionary Equilibrium that was developed by Schaffer (1989). 
They consider a population split into two groups and playing a strategy qi є (0,1) with the relative 
expected payoff πi. 
A deviant player is one employing some other strategy pi є (0,1). Individuals in the game are 
anonymous, as are preferences and costs, such that a single voter’s fitness is the proxy of income 
compared with the total population. That is, individuals may learn a deviant strategy in order to 
increase their relative income. A voter i may learn the deviant strategy if: 
 
,
 
 
where 
 
is the set of strategies played by all other players. Thus, individuals have an incentive to 
learn a deviant strategy in order to increase their social position with respect to the rest of the 
population. The adaptation process continues until an EVE is reached. 
An EVE occurs, then, whenever there is no deviant strategy with a higher payoff than
 
.  The 
turnout dynamics depending on voting costs prove to be ambiguous because voters in the same 
group facing different voting costs may act differently. Finally, in a context of varying voting costs 
and varying group size, the no-voting condition is not an EVE and the paradox of not voting 
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disappears. Because individuals are allowed to learn deviant strategies, the Sieg and Schultz (1995) 
model has some aspects in common with LV. 
Evolutionary models are able to explain reported fluctuations in actual turnout levels in a time 
series analysis but fail to explain why electoral participation varies between different election types. 
Furthermore, because the adaptive process requires numerous iterations, this class of models cannot 
easily be tested econometrically and experimentally. 
 
4. Learning theory: an overview. 
As distinct from EV, LV is characterized by considering agents behaviour to not be fixed because 
individuals are assumed to learn on the basis of their own experience (or the experiences of others). 
Hence, individuals may receive feedback on their own past behaviour and may use that feedback 
through a learning algorithm as a basis for choosing actions in the future. Another key feature is the 
concept of optimal choice under LV assumptions. Basically, in the LV world, individuals may reach 
the optimal choice as a consequence of a trial and error process. Until the optimal point is reached, 
individuals reasonably reach suboptimal points. That is, under LV assumptions, individuals try to 
achieve some satisfaction level (defined by a minimum threshold) rather than strictly optimizing 
utility (Simon 1957).  
The learning process is defined as an algorithm mapping individual behaviour on the basis of past 
experience. According to Selten (1991), learning processes may be distinguished as 
a) belief learning, whereby individuals reinforce or weaken prior beliefs through new experiences; 
b) imitation of others’ success, whereby individuals utilize the experience of others; and 
c) response reinforcement, whereby individuals confirm previous choices in cases of positive 
outcomes and change preferences according to negative outcomes over successive rounds. 
Although even some rational models have considered such behaviours, learning theory as applied to 
voters’ choices has been developed recently as an independent explanation. 
The simplest algorithm in this framework is that of reinforcement learning. This algorithm assumes 
that individuals look to their past experiences in order to confirm or inform changes in their 
behaviour. More specifically, for a given aspiration level, individuals are more likely to choose 
strategies that produce satisfactory payoffs. Such a process does not require individuals to have full 
information about the game structure or about the behaviour of other players.  
 
4.1 Learning models and turnout. 
Learning theory differs from traditional rational theories of voting behaviour in assuming that 
individuals adapt their behaviour over successive elections on the basis of a level of satisfaction. 
Kanazawa (1998) builds on the Flache and Macy (Flache and Macy 2002, Macy 1990, 1993, Macy 
and Flache 1995) studies of bounded rationality and stochastic learning processes. Flache and Macy 
strongly challenge the rational framework, arguing that, generally, many individuals are not fully 
capable of performing a rational calculus. To the contrary, they suggest that individual choices may 
stem from the observation of past experience and the outcome of collective actions. Under this 
assumption, they model the stochastic learning process as a generalization of the Bush and 
Mosteller (1955) model applied to collective actions. Individuals are assumed to be backward-
looking learners rather than forward-looking maximisers. This implies that individuals perceive the 
correlation between actions and outcomes rather than the causal link. They simply understand 
outcomes as a reinforcement or punishment for their behaviour. Kanazawa applies this framework 
to voting behaviour, trying to find a link between Macy’s point and traditional rational choice 
theory. According to Kanazawa, individuals adapt their behaviour depending on election outcomes, 
on one hand, and on the other hand, these individuals still perform an instrumental calculus. That is 
to say, Kanazawa (1998) models the traditional calculus of voting by redefining the p and D term 
and applying the stochastic learning process,  defined as “Win-stay, Lose-shift” (or stochastic 
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learning in voting). He argues that because individuals may not calculate ex ante the probability of 
being pivotal voters, their true p is the probability that their previous behaviour was associated with 
a win. At the same time, election outcomes reinforce or weaken individual senses of civic duty (the 
D term). Hence, the adjustment process works for both p and D but at different speeds. As a 
consequence, voters who have voted for the winning candidate will increase their probability of 
turning out for the next election, while those who voted for the loser will decrease their propensity 
to vote (and the same logic governs the behaviour of individuals who abstain). Finally, Kanazawa 
(1998, 2000) provides econometrical evidence for the stochastic learning model. Kanazawa (2000) 
presents results from a logistic regression using pooled data from the GSS dataset (USA). 
Unfortunately, the regression outcome looks ambiguous, and Martin and Shieh (2003) suggest that 
Kanazawa’s (1998) findings critically depend on coding irregularities and sample selection. They 
replicate Kanazawa’s estimations but do not find evidence of Stochastic Learning in voting. 
As in Kanazawa (2000), the learning process described by Collins and Kumar et al. (2009) depends 
on whether individuals have previously voted and whether their party won. Equilibria are derived 
by aggregating the corresponding variables. Positive turnout levels are confirmed, but there is no 
link with the traditional rational framework. 
Bendor and Diermeier (2003) model an adaptation process that combines reinforcement learning 
and endogenous aspiration. Here, voters are split into two groups with regard to political 
preferences. Each individual, at time t, has a starting propensity to vote denoted by pit and an 
aspiration level ait. Propensity probabilistically determines who votes and who is the winner at time 
t. Then, given positive voting costs and a benefit b>c for the winners, individuals compare obtained 
payoffs (πit) and aspiration levels and eventually adjust their propensities in the next stage. The 
adjustment direction depends on the received feedback. The aspiration-based adjustment rule 
(ABAR) is defined as follows
3
: 
 
  
 
 
 
 
In their computational application, the authors also allow for individuals to be partially or fully 
inertial. That is, individuals adjust aspiration with exogenous defined probability and propensity 
with an exogenous probability . Previous election feedback affects individual propensity through 
a reinforcement mechanism that was first derived by Bush and Mosteller (1955). 
Further, they run computational simulations in order to determine long-run equilibria. Positive 
turnout levels result, even when considering positive voting costs. The model is able to capture and 
explain a broader set of stylized facts, dealing also with civic duty and unrealistic aspirations. 
Nevertheless, Fowler (2006) rejects the use of the Bush-Mosteller reinforcement rule because it 
leads to a biased outcome. The reinforcement rule, indeed, has incoherent effects on the individual 
propensity to vote so that individuals engage in casual voting. This bias occurs because adaptation 
varies with the initial level of . Moreover, casual voting conflicts with empirical evidence on 
habitual voting. The latter can be viewed as an alternative dynamic explanation for voting still 
based on a reinforcement rule (Plutzer 2002). In this case, however, the reinforcement rule is based 
not on a learning process but rather on voting reinforcement. Voters do not learn the best strategy 
                                                   
3 This is a simplified version of the adaptation conditions. In the original version, the adjustment process is limited by 
some exogenous propensity barriers.  
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based on the effect that voting has on their psychological status or through an evolutionary process. 
Under HV assumptions, voting is a process of habit formation, and past experience in voting 
reinforces individual behaviour. If a voter has previously voted then she will increase her propensity 
to vote, and the converse holds if she has abstained. Thus, HV suffers from the same limitation in 
its civic duty solution, simply allowing civic duty to be a dynamic process increasing (or 
decreasing) over time. Although this solution has received much empirical support both through 
econometrical models (Plutzer 2002, Gerber et al. 2003) and experiments (Gerber et al. 2008, Green 
and Sachar 2000), it remains poor in explanatory power. On one hand, it confirms individual 
behaviour as an evolving process where dynamics play a relevant role. On the other hand, it 
definitively rejects the hypothesis of a relationship between voting and the political sphere, thus 
considering only the psychological effect. This occurs for two reasons. First, although a 
reinforcement process is confirmed, it is not related to the political context or to the feedback effect 
of the political outcome of individual behaviour. And secondly, by considering individual choices 
to be restricted to only two alternatives (voting or abstaining), it totally excludes the possibility that 
individual behaviour could somehow depend on a fuller range alternatives. According to Tillman 
(2008) and Greene (2009), all the solutions that do not allow the act of voting to depend on a full set 
of choices are biased because they indirectly assume that all the solutions are equivalent for all 
individuals. 
However, the concept of habitual voting may helps as it confirms the need for a dynamic modelling 
of voter behaviour. 
Martorana and Mazza (2012) provide an empirical work exploring voters’ persistence in choices. 
Voters are backward-looking adapters and behave on the basis of variations in their economic 
status. The authors derive an outcome-based learning mechanism based on the following 
assumptions: (a) people expect that the party they (do not) support will be (un)able to bring 
economic improvements; (b) In between elections they receive a feedback whose impact depends 
on the consistency between their last voting behavior and personal economic improvements (or 
worsening) from the last election; (c) a consistent feedback occurs when, as a result of incumbent’s 
policies, income variation in between elections meets individual aspirations; (d) In turn, voters 
confirm their previous voting choices if the feedback is consistent and tend to discard choices 
associated to an inconsistent feedback. Assuming political preferences not to be exogenous, the 
authors show that individual choices can be modelled by linking the adjustment of preferences to 
variations in individual economic wellbeing. 
Diermeier and Mieghem (2008) and Demichelis and Dhillon (2010) are examples of game 
theoretical models that apply a learning voter approach. In both models, individuals use past 
election outcomes or polls in order to estimate the behaviour of other voters and then act 
accordingly, still performing the instrumental (cost-benefit) calculus. In both the models, 
individuals have only bounded rationality. In Diermeier and Mieghem (2008), agents receive noisy 
signals through opinion polls. The results show that even a relatively small amount of noise is 
critical and may generate substantial turnout levels. However, turnout levels are not monotonic in 
terms of noise level, so turnout may fall considerably in the presence of high noise in polls. In large 
populations and in the absence of any uncertainty, the participation game leads to vanishing turnout, 
as in the classic game-theoretical models (except in the case of exactly equal factions). Substantial 
turnout levels, in this case, require a high level of noise, a low cost-benefit ratio and some degree of 
closeness in the election. The model also explores the hypothesis, suggested by Aldrich (1993), that 
individual behaviour may not fully respond to cost-benefit calculations. The results show that action 
noise, as well as polling noise, leads to positive and high turnout levels. Moreover, a key insight of 
this model, for our purposes, is that the bounded rationality assumption is not sufficient, in a game-
theoretical setting, to solve the paradox of not voting. High levels of turnout require a stochastic 
component in voter modelling. 
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The Demichelis and Dhillon (2010) model is based on the calculus of voting, and voting propensity 
strictly depends on the probability of the vote being pivotal. Individuals use past election outcomes 
or opinion polls to adjust their expectations about the closeness of elections. Generally, the model 
predicts multiple equilibria: full turnout, high turnout, low turnout and zero turnout. It compares 
mixed strategy equilibria under both complete and incomplete information. In both cases, positive 
(but low) turnout levels may occur according to the values of parameters. Strategies are evaluated in 
terms of stability in the long run. While this model, like many game theoretic models, is not suited 
to large populations, it gives many interesting insights and explains several stylized facts. Turnout 
is decreases with voting costs and population size. Moreover, the model’s predictions are consistent 
with the observed decline of turnout levels in western democracies.  
Landi and Sodini (2010) apply the insights of previous papers and add social conformism to the 
calculus. In their dynamic model (like the previous two models), individuals use past turnout in 
order to generate expectations regarding turnout in the next election. In turn, individuals measure 
both the marginal costs and benefits of voting on the basis of these expectations. Final voting 
decisions may also depend on individual preferences regarding conformism. Conformist behaviour 
may act as a counterforce with respect to the traditional cost-benefit analysis.  
These last three models represent two alternative ways of modelling voter behaviour as a 
participation game under bounded rationality, by assuming some learning mechanism. Although 
these models are quite different, they explore the voting paradox from the same point of view, and 
they both predict positive turnout levels under specific conditions. 
 
5. Concluding remarks. 
Rational models of turnout apply an economic approach to political behaviour. To date, many 
improvements in modelling have been proposed in attempts to solve the paradox of not voting that 
occurs as a result of the apparent fact that the low probability of  casting a pivotal vote in a large 
electorate means that voting costs will always overcome benefits. That is, individuals should 
rationally abstain from voting. Some researchers suggest that individuals may receive a 
consumption benefit from the act of voting itself. Others have focused their attention on the 
empirical realization of C and p.  
Two other solutions, recently developed, explain the reported positive turnouts. These are the 
Evolutionary and Learning voting models. The dynamic approach sheds a new light on political 
participation because it captures the time-varying aspect of political preferences and provides 
realistic predictions about how individuals will behave. 
Although EV and LV are not without limits in modelling such a complex phenomenon, they seem 
to be the most promising frameworks for predicting consistent levels of turnout and explaining 
several noted stylized facts. 
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